Abstract-The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a risk framework for modeling high-impact, low-frequency power grid events to support risk-informed decisions. In this paper, we briefly recap the framework and demonstrate its implementation for seismic and geomagnetic hazards using a benchmark reliability test system. We describe integration of a collection of models implemented to perform hazard analysis, fragility evaluation, consequence estimation, and postevent restoration. We demonstrate the value of the framework as a multihazard power grid risk assessment and management tool. The research will benefit transmission planners and emergency planners by improving their ability to maintain a resilient grid infrastructure against impacts from major events.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standards require utilities to plan for extreme bulk electric system (BES) events, also referred to herein as high-impact, low-frequency (HILF) events resulting in multiple power system assets failing or cascading out of service. Planning events in the NERC Standard include [1] : 1) significant generation and load loss in a widespread area; 2) an unstable grid; and 3) circumstances requiring multijurisdictional coordination. Analysis of these events require consideration of the loss of multiple redundancies (n-k contingency situations). A recent report on power resilience and restoration planning highlighted the need to identify the important concerns and needs following extreme events such as black starts, tie lines, and SCADA [2] .
Elements encompassed by the HILF event risk framework [3] developed by the authors was followed with a subsequent trial implementation assuming a single hazard [4] . In this HILF event framework, an initiating event is the realization of an extreme event associated with a given hazard. For instance, a The authors are with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA 99354 USA (e-mail: arun.veeramany@pnnl.gov; Garill.Coles@pnnl.gov; stephen.unwin@pnnl.gov; Tony.Nguyen@pnnl.gov; jeff.dagle@pnnl.gov).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/JSYST.2017.2737993 magnitude 9.3 earthquake caused by a rupture trace of a fault along the coast of Washington State is a realization of the seismic hazard. An initiating event leads to a sequence of events resulting in power grid and supporting infrastructure network disruption. This sequence of events is referred to as an accident sequence in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) community. The consequence of an accident sequence associated with the power grid might be defined as the loss of power over the affected geographic area for a duration of time until functionality is restored. The development of a risk model involves systematic, and to the extent possible, comprehensive identification of accident sequences, their likelihood of occurrence, and the magnitude of their impact. The essence of risk assessment that makes it useful for planning purposes is this consideration of event likelihood and consequences.
In the present research, our focus is on integration of models that fulfill the functional requirements of elements associated with the risk framework with the objective of developing an end-to-end risk model. Though some of the constituent models employed in our current implementation of the HILF event framework are simplified at this stage, we anticipate expanding to a more comprehensive demonstration of the framework. In our current research, we limit our implementation to evaluation of seismic and geomagnetic risk to a benchmark reliability power grid test system. Furthermore, we focus on evaluating the impact of seismic and geomagnetic events on buses, transformers, and transmission lines as the core assets to test our framework. The constituent models of our demonstration address the following: 1) seismic and geomagnetic hazard analysis; 2) asset fragility analysis; 3) consequence analysis; 4) restoration analysis; 5) importance analysis.
With our integrated demonstration model, we set the necessary precedents for developing a comprehensive and realistic risk-informed, multihazard decision-support resiliency model.
II. PRECEDENTS
There is extensive literature on various domain models (hazard, fragility, power flow, and restoration) with varying degrees of applicability to elements of the HILF risk framework. Candidate and state of the art models were preliminarily identified in an initial publication by the authors about the HILF 1937-9234 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
risk framework [3] . Additional literature that was found to be especially relevant to our demonstration implementation of the HILF framework are discussed later. A risk assessment on Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) transmission substations and the associated transmission network under earthquake loading was performed by Eidinger and Kempner [5] . This study includes characterization of the seismic hazard analysis for this area, determination of the impact of seismic events of different magnitudes, and determination of the repair times and economic impacts associated with those seismic events. A similar study was performed by Shinozuka et al. on the seismic performance of Western interconnection using power flow analysis to determine the impact of grid asset failures to the BES [6] . Stochastic methods were used by a number of authors in the civil engineering community to evaluate hurricane risk to the power grid [7] - [9] . Work by Lin and Adams provides helpful seismic fragility of hydropower components [10] . Gjerde et al. in their work recommend applying a PRA to assessment of the risk to power systems associated with extreme events by using fault trees, event trees, consequence diagrams, risk diagrams, and bow-tie models that structure the analysis in terms of threats, unwanted events, barriers, and consequences [11] . Ciapessoni et al. [12] , [13] and Kjølle and Gjerde [14] have extensively investigated risk and vulnerability frameworks in the context of power system security as they relate to threats and uncertainties.
In almost all the studies surveyed in this section, the addition of loss of power consequence estimates, consideration of infrastructure that support the power grid, and identification of restoration strategies would make the studies more complete. IEEE Task Forces and working groups have been exploring methodologies and challenges associated with risk assessment of cascading outages including their benchmarking, validation, combinatorics of contingencies, and computational complexities [15] , [16] .
III. HILF EVENT RISK MODEL
The HILF event risk assessment framework [3] identifies modeling needs that have to be integrated to successfully analyze an event scenario. Integration of these models is a major challenge for a number of reasons. One primary reason is that although adequate multiple state of the art models exist for some elements of the HILF event framework, the capability of state of the art-domain models needs to be expanded for other elements. Another challenge is that the interfaces and between models that we wish to integrate was not necessarily developed to work with each other. This section further discusses individual models selected for demonstration implementation of the HILF event framework and associated modeling issues.
A. Power System Network Model
The power system transmission network connects power generation assets to consumption points (referred to as loads) through redundant transmission lines (also referred to as branches or tie lines). The nodal points are buses (generation buses, load buses, and connectivity buses) typically hosted at substations that also contain other critical assets such as transformers and protection systems.
To add some perspective, there are about 75 000 circuit miles of transmission lines in the Western interconnection. There are about 81 000 transmission towers and 15 000 circuit miles of transmission lines under the jurisdiction of the BPA alone, and there are more than 15 000 generators and 10 000 power plants in the North American Power grid [5] .
The standard format for defining an electrical power system network is the IEEE bus-branch common data format; though proprietary formats also exist allowing broader flexibility and asset inclusion. These formats do not allow the incorporation of full set of grid assets and support infrastructure. Hence, it is anticipated that available models will need to be customized and expanded to develop a comprehensive HILF model.
In our demonstration of framework implementation, we use the IEEE 145-bus benchmark reliability test system. The test system has 52 transformers, connects 145 buses through a network of 453 transmission lines, 50 generation assets, and serves about 2.83 GW of load. This test system was chosen because it has a high average "degree of distribution." This term, "degree of distribution" is a graph-theoretic metric that refers to the number of transmission lines a node (bus) is connected to [17] . A high number (6.25 in this case) means the grid has a lot of built-in redundancy and should exhibit a degree of toughness to extreme events. Most real grids have a degree of distribution of about 2 or 3. Another reason for choosing this system is that it also comes with dynamic test data. We anticipate future modeling will include use of a dynamic contingency power flow tool, and in that case, we will need the dynamic test data. Also, the choice of a nonreal world test model permits initial validation of the risk framework without generating or disseminating any sensitive information regarding the vulnerability of real networks.
B. Seismic Hazard Analysis
The manifestation of hazards are referred to in the PRA community as initiating events that would in the case of a seismic event fail a given set of grid assets and start a ripple effect in the power system. While multiple hazards potentially pose various degrees of threat to the network and are location specific, decision makers tend to be most interested in planning for events that are clearly proven to be risk significant in the near future. For instance, though the likelihood of a seismic rupture in the Cascadia subduction zone of at least magnitude 8.0 is only about one in 250 years, the magnitude of the consequences produced by such an event may merit transmission planning and emergency preparedness attention. Other hazards such as wind storms and ice loading that are relatively frequent and to which the Western interconnect is susceptible, may produce significant but lesser consequences. The risk associated with these events may or may not be as important as a large earthquake. Insights from quantitative evaluation of risk arising using the HILF model for multiple hazards provides decision makers with information needed to make decisions about strengthening assets and bolstering resilience planning. In our demonstration of the framework implementation, we chose to focus on the seismic hazard associated with the Cascadia subduction zone in the Pacific Northwest for which a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) [18] has been published. A PSHA has three constituent submodels: 1) source characterization; 2) ground motion attenuation; and 3) site characterization.
The recurrence interval for seismic events (see Fig. 1 ) and potential epicenters used in our model were taken from the Hanford PSHA study of sources with a minimum threshold magnitude of 8.0. We used U.S. Geological Survey's ground motion attenuation (GMA) model implemented in the OpenSHA open source platform [19] , [20] . The GMA model uses several input parameters associated with the event source (e.g., depth, slip type, epicenter, magnitude, etc.) and site characterization (soil type/site class) to produce a probabilistic distribution of seismic loading at the site. The site referred to herein is the location of a critical grid asset whose response to a seismic event needs to be evaluated. An example of such a probability of exceedance curve is shown in Fig. 2 using the peak ground acceleration (pga) as the ground motion acting at a hypothetical asset site. 
C. Seismic Hazard-Asset Fragility
Fragility or vulnerability refers to the probability of failure of an asset conditional on the disturbance caused at the site location in response to an initiator. The fragility of some electric grid assets often depends on their rated capacity (e.g., base KV for buses), while the fragility of other assets (e.g., mechanical assets) depends on their rated strength. The fragility of an asset can be decreased by mitigative features designed to reduce the impact of a seismic event. Examples of mitigative features include increasing the rigidity of a bus structure and anchoring transformers. Outside of a National Institute of Building Sciences technical manual for earthquake loss estimation methods for electric power utilities [21] , fragility data appear to be sparse. This technical manual presents lognormal distributions for major assets at a transmission substation categorized by asset rated capacity and mitigative features. Fragility curves for transformers and buses are illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4.
In our demonstration of framework implementation, we considered buses, transformers, and transmission towers as the assets of concern. Transmission towers form the basis for supporting transmission lines and are known to be susceptible to seismic events. The failure of any one tower along a transmission line was assumed to operationally fail that line. A total of 1584 towers were located at set geographical distances along a line length of 7742 miles to approximate actual transmission towers. The fragility of transmission towers depends on their design and the material used in their construction. We used fragility data associated with the most conservative type of towers analyzed in a study by Park et al. [22] . The model can be expanded to include support infrastructure and various other asset types such as generators, control centers, and protection systems. However, availability of credible fragility data for additional assets and infrastructure could be a challenge as well as the availability of grid simulation models that support these asset types.
D. Geomagnetic Disturbance Hazard Analysis
Increased flow of geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) in the power grid infrastructure is a result of the earth's geoelectric field fluctuation in response to a geomagnetic storm. Extrahigh-voltage transformers could fail due to intense internal heat resulting from these induced currents. The need for comprehensive risk management assessment is starting to be recognized and mitigative strategies using series capacitors and protective relays have been identified as possible mitigation mechanisms [23] , [24] . On the one hand, advanced studies indicate that supersubstorms are likely to be precursor to extremely intense substorms [25] causing catastrophic impact on the power grid. On the other hand, transformer specific observations have not encountered either confirmed or latent transformer failures for induced currents even at high levels (i.e., 87 A) [26] . Available research literature conveys challenges in establishing a magnitude frequency distribution for geoelectric fields [27] , [28] though such characterization is available for geomagnetic activity based on its activity index K p [29] . Active research at U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in mapping geoelectric field hazard associated with extreme geomagnetic storms onto geographic regions is anticipated to be of immense help to analysts and those responsible for managing electric power [30] .
The NERC poses in their guidance a once-per-century benchmark event for assessing system performance under geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) type HILF events [28] . The validity of this benchmark was confirmed by Los Alamos National Laboratory in an independent assessment [31] . The defined event assumed peak amplitude of 8 V/km at reference latitude of 60°. Further, earth conductivity β and geomagnetic latitude α scaling factors were derived that act as transfer functions to translate the benchmark event to a region of interest
α is a function of the geomagnetic latitude L
Such benchmark events can be generated using methodology to construct 100-year recurrence scenarios [32] . The same research article proposes a simple linear characterization of induced currents stemming from electric field disturbances
The parameters a and b depend on topology of the electrical power grid with values ranging from 0 to 200 A km/V. The variation in GIC is known to be dependent on derivative of the magnetic field as well as the site's geology. Other sophisticated methodologies and tools that model induced current flows through a power system network also exist [33] - [38] . It appears that no domain models exist that probabilistically characterize fragility of critical power grid assets under the influence of geomagnetic HILF events. Such approaches, though exist for electromagnetic pulse events [39] , [40] for certain electric power system assets. Nonetheless, NERC Standard TPL-007-1 requires thermal impact assessments to be performed for transformers whose maximum effected GIC is 75-A per phase [28] .
In our demonstration of the framework implementation, geographic variability in the geoelectric field is modeled for an event. Based on this and location-dependent ground inductance, geoelectric field at each grid component is estimated. Based on network topology and the conductance of component, probability of exceedance of the induced current is estimated. In our implementation model, only the fragility of transformers with respect to induced current is modeled.
Twenty-four hours' worth of geoelectric field data for the March 13 and 14, 1989 geomagnetic storm was retrieved from Natural Resources Canada's geoelectric field plotting service (spaceweather.ca). The data suggest that the event resulted in peak amplitude of about 1.2 V/km. We fit normal distributions to the horizontal components of the geographic field (northward: Ex ∼ N(−0.1046, 0.053) V/km and eastward: Ey∼N(0.171, 0.236) V/km) for 1 h of the data subset that encloses peak amplitude between 7:30 AM and 8:00 AM UTC on March 13, and 1:00 AM and 1:30 AM UTC on March 14. For the purposes of our implementation model, we scaled the normal distribution for the 1989 storm such that the peak amplitude was 8 and 20 V/km with recurrence of 100 and 1000 years, respectively. The scaling was done on eastward component alone to produce peak amplitude consistent with the 1989 storm observations. We assumed that the NERC scaling factors α and β remain the same even if the peak amplitude deviated from 8 V/km. We assumed that α ranges from 0.3 to 0.5 for the study region considered with 0.46 taken from NERC guidance [28] . Geographic to geomagnetic latitude conversion was done using Richmond (1995) implemented by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration APEX geomagnetic coordinate conversion program. We set the system parameters in (3) to 5 A km/V and considered transformers to be susceptible to induced currents and in the absence of fragility information, assumed a normal distribution with 75 A as the mean induced current with 1-A standard deviation.
E. Conditional Asset Failure Analysis
Hazard analysis produces site load curves conditional on the hazardous event and fragility analysis produces an asset's capacity curve. Load here refers to stress induced on the assets and should not be confused with power demand in electric power systems. A comparison of load and capacity from specific real-ization of these curves determines if the asset fails in response to the HILF event initiator. Repeating these steps for every asset in the power network generates a scenario vector identifying the assets that failed and those that survived the HILF event. This element of the framework implementation reflects probabilistic nature of grid response to an extreme event. We identified multiple ways to address this complexity: 1) convolve both the load and capacity curves to get a conditional probability of failure, and then, go to 2) or 2) perform a regular Monte Carlo simulation on the load and capacity curves separately or 3) use Monte Carlo simulation with a variance reduction scheme on the load and capacity curves separately. 1) and 2) lead to larger variance in the estimated consequences and require a large number of samples. The use of Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) techniques for power systems reliability analysis (option c) was demonstrated by Shu and Jirutitijaroen [41] .
In our demonstration of the framework implementation, we used the LHS Monte Carlo technique [42] to sample from load and capacity curves. This scheme ensures all segments of the probability scale (0 to 1) are represented in the generated samples. If n HILF initiators are selected and m strata are considered within the probability scale for each load and capacity curve across N assets, then the estimated number of samples taken is n(2 m)N across 2 mN random variables assuming the n initiators are deterministically chosen scenarios with known frequencies.
We tested the framework by modeling n = 50 seismic events and n = 2 GMD events, m = 2000 samples from each load and capacity curve and N = 2234 assets for seismic hazard and N = 52 transformer assets for GMD hazard. The run produced 100 000 seismic scenario vectors and 4000 GMD scenario vectors for further analysis (i.e., consequence analysis, restoration time estimation, and importance analysis).
F. Geographic Representation of the Power System Network
It is anticipated that geographic coordinates of power grid assets will be known. The power grid test systems typically represent real networks but do not come with coordinate information. Hence, a method to generate proxy coordinates is necessary whether the system considered is test or a real system.
In our demonstration of the framework implementation, we generated geographic coordinates in a three-step process. First, we developed a network graph of the benchmark system with buses as nodes and transmission lines as edges. Second, we assumed each bus not connected to a transformer was at a distinct location and grouped the buses together that connected transformers. This assumption was necessary because the test system does not host substation information. Third, we created a visual representation of the network using "graphviz" graph visualization software [43] . Cartesian coordinates were transformed into geographic coordinates by overlaying the network on the geographical region of interest. Fig. 5 shows the geographical layout of grouped assets used on our demonstration model. The asset positions can vary depending on the "graphviz" filter used for automating the layout. Note that every asset under consideration is subject to the haz- ard, however uncertainty distributions associated with hazard curve and fragility curve only are randomly sampled.
G. Consequence Analysis
We identified three recognized methodologies to determine HILF consequence: 1) use of topological graph models; 2) steady state power flow analysis; and 3) dynamic power flow analysis. Any or a combination of the three approaches methods can be used in an implementation of the HILF event framework. An important aspect to consequence analysis is identification of a metric that is suitable for grid planners and other decision makers using the risk-informed models. At the transmission level, load not served within the system over a specified period of time is a metric of interest (i.e., megawatt hours of load shed has been recommended as a metric by some [16] , [44] , [45] ). From this metric, economic losses and cost-benefit analysis can be performed. An important outcome of this analysis is the approximate estimation of load buses affected and load not served due to other assets going out of service. The discussion of the estimation of time duration that load is not served is deferred to Section III-H.
A good explanation of the limitations of topological models in analyzing power system networks is provided given by Cvijic and Ilic [46] and Hines et al. [47] . According to the cited literature, consequence estimates are unlikely to be accurate. However, since these publications, Wegner [48] has compared network flow models for power grids with power flow simulation models and show that graph-theoretical electrical flow models perform well in comparison. In Wegner's work, losses were presented as load deviations in megawatt units. Variations of graph-theoretical and topological techniques appear to have found widespread acceptance in vulnerability modeling especially for interdependent critical infrastructure failure analysis [17] , [49] - [51] .
Pfitzner used MATPOWER for solving power flow associated with cascading outages in which one or two lines are initially tripped, and then, used heuristics to determine outages associated with further line loss to estimate the fraction of load not served [52] . However, when large number of assets fail across widespread areas in response to HILF event initiator, these tools experience nonconvergence issues even before effect of cascading outages is addressed. For these types of scenarios, it is not clear whether the nonconvergence is due to grid instability or mathematical intractability. In such cases, an advantage of the network graph technique is that it can be used to analyze large asset losses in the network though neither power flow nor instability issues can be accurately estimated.
Dynamic contingency analysis tools (e.g., DCAT [53] ) are at the forefront of the state of the art for analyzing the time evolution of a contingency and subsequent cascades that can results from an HILF event. However, analysis using a dynamic contingency analysis tools becomes even more complex with incorporation of protection systems and operator intervention modeling. A steady-state simulation tool can be initially run to prescreen a list of initiators that can potential lead to cascading outages. Using these tools, overloads and voltage deviations form the basis for scenario selection and further analysis to estimate load loss. That said, this promising methodology is computationally expensive and its applicability to HILF events is still being investigated [16] .
Accordingly, in the interim, we used simplified network graph techniques to demonstrate our framework implementation. The results of our consequence analysis do not necessarily reflect what real-world load losses would be or are not necessarily comparable with the results from power flow models. We anticipate, despite major challenges that after dynamic power flow tools are robustly tested for handling grid instability arising from the failure of a large number of assets, our framework implementation will be adapted to include them. In our model, buses (load, generation, and connectivity) were considered to be vertices, and transmission lines and transformer connectivity between buses were considered as undirected weighted edges. Weights of all edges were initially set to zero, and then, selectively assigned a value of 1.0 in the event of failure of a transmission line or transformer. Dijkstra's algorithm [54] was used to determine if a load bus could at all be connected to any of the generation buses. In case of a bus failure, all edges connected to the bus vertex were invalidated by assigning a value of 1.0. This scheme ensures that a path from a load bus to generation bus, if exists, has a path weight of zero. If no connectivity exists, then the load was assumed to be unserved and to contribute to total consequences quantified for a scenario. Overloads, partial load curtailment, and protection system mechanisms were conservatively not considered. The unserved load buses were identified and archived for restoration analysis.
The percentage contribution of generation assets to any given load was not modeled, though such models do exist as part of economic dispatch algorithms for deregulated markets [55] . These models are partially closed form as they intermittently rely on power flow solutions to estimate contributions using sensitivity analysis.
H. Restoration Analysis
For the purposes of our demonstration implementation, successful grid restoration post-HILF event was assumed to consist of the following equally important basic steps [56] : 1) restoration of generation; 2) energization of transmission lines; and 3) gradual addition of loads while maintaining grid stability. Restoration of generation involves identifying, choosing, and activating one or more designated blackstart generators given the situational complexities. Transmission line restoration depends on the number of support towers lost and length of the line affected. The entire grid should be gradually restored in isolated islands to begin with, followed by gradual connectivity across regions so that balance is maintained between generation and consumption. Modeling these steps can be achieved if the following models are suitably available: 1) asset recovery model; 2) support infrastructure recovery model; and 3) overarching grid restoration model. A realistic restoration model would be one that accounts for logistics, spares, and crew availability. A realistic model would also distinguish an asset failure from a tripped protection system. In our demonstration of the framework implementation, we used a simplified model in which it was assumed that the recovery time for a bus was one time unit, the recovery time for a transformer was two time units, and the recovery time for transmission lines was three units. We assigned these assumed repair time units as weights to edges of the network graph so that for each disconnected load bus, the least weighted path represents the optimum combination of assets to restore in order to reach a servable generator. (The least weighted path cannot be zero because a zero weight indicates that there is no need for restoration.) Repeating this process across all the affected load buses produces milestones representing a resiliency curve associated with gradual grid recovery. The analysis results in identification of the minimum assets that need to be restored for each scenario vector, and the restoration of the assets needed for complete functional recovery of the grid without restoring every failed asset. This analysis can be expanded include estimation of recovery times, costs, and crew resources.
I. Importance Analysis for Decision Support
Though risk analysis will generate valuable information for power grid and emergency planners, decision makers have only finite resources and cannot afford to strengthen all vulnerable power grid assets against every hazard. Hence, an importance analysis [57] that risk ranks assets is considered. An importance analysis can be performed individually for each hazard, initiating event or broadly across all hazards.
In our demonstration of the risk framework implementation, we aggregated megawatt-time units of load lost estimated across Monte Carlo iterations with the annual frequency of event occurrence to produce a quantified risk estimate for the seismic hazard. For each of the power grid assets that failed at least B136  81%  EQ  L256  10%  EQ  L243  8%  EQ  B74  6%  EQ  T65  6%  EQ  T64  6%  EQ  T65  100%  GMD  T64 100% GMD once in a scenario sector, we reran the entire analysis assuming the asset never failed. The percentage difference in the pre-and postrisk estimates reflect the risk reduction that can be achieved by ensuring that the asset never failed in the first place. The transmission planners and state planners can use this kind of information to make informed choices and develop strategies such development of a strategic spare reserve programs and establishing asset strengthening initiatives.
IV. SEISMIC HAZARD-RESULTS
It should be noted that the objective of this research has been putting the framework to test rather than an accurate quantification of risk. We used 50 earthquakes as seismic initiating events with varying epicenters and magnitudes as inputs to the USGS ground motion model. The events were assumed to originate at point source locations with magnitudes up to a maximum of 8.5. For other parameters such as shear wave velocity (Vs), default values were used. The outputs from the model were peak ground acceleration probabilistic exceedance (load) curves. The LHS Monte Carlo sampling was used to compare the load curves against the fragility curves of each asset which generated about 100 000 scenario vectors. Each scenario containing failed assets was defined as a list of comma-separated values (csv) containing the unique asset identification numbers (ids) associated with the failed assets. For example, "L452, B17, T33, T55, T70," represented loss of lines (L), buses (B), and transformers (T) with respective ids. If transmission towers failed, their ids were substituted with ids of lines. The most complex scenario consisted of about 77 asset failures.
Assessing the generated scenarios using the graph-theoretic model yielded a maximum load loss equivalent to 30% of the servable load. If the seismic event were to be a rupture along the Cascadia subduction zone rather than a point source event, the consequences are anticipated to be much larger. About 45% of scenarios resulted in at least one asset failure. About 72% of these scenarios resulted in asset failures but did not result in any load loss indicating the robustness of the test system and built-in redundancy. For each scenario, the load buses that were not entirely served were also tracked by identifying them on csv lists (e.g., "B81, B74,"). For each such load bus affected, Dijkstra's algorithms based on repair time weights was used to identify a functional generation bus and the minimal number of failed assets that needed to be restored to get the load bus reconnected in the least amount of time. These recovery schemes were represented as "[B L {A i }B G ](t)(x%);" signifying assets A i can be restored within t time units in order to connect load bus B L with generation bus B G and recover x% of total load lost in the network. For each scenario and for each load bus affected in that scenario, a list of such "restoration schemes" were generated to return 100% of the servable load in the network.
Along with operational restoration of each load bus, a resilience curve was generated to track the amount of load recovered along with restoration time represented by "t1:x1%; t2:x2%; . . . tn:100%" signifying that by time t1, x1% of load was recovered and so on. An example of such a generated resilience curve is "3:39%; 4:78%; 5:100%;" An illustration of the results for a single scenario is shown in Table II . The restoration of multiple load buses relies on recovery of certain assets that are common to all these load buses. These overlaps were identified and a set of unique assets was compiled across all restoration schemes for a given scenario. Each such set is a subset of the scenario being analyzed and is referred to here as "minimal scenarios." The total recovery time for each of these minimal scenarios was considered to be the scenario recovery time.
The risk to the power system network due to a single initiator was quantified as the product of event frequency and load shed and duration estimated in MW-t/yr. Repair time was left dimensionless, but could be presented in the units associated with an actual recovery models (e.g., man-weeks). The quantified risk was aggregated across initiating events to produce a single risk estimate (HILF event risk) for the associated hazard. The expected seismic risk to the benchmark system was 43 MW-t/yr.
Minimal scenarios across the entire analysis are those critical asset combinations that need to be protected as part of the resilience planning process. In order to risk rank critical assets, we conducted an importance analysis by revisiting each scenario and assuming each asset never failed. The percentage difference in the original HILF event risk and the risk after the failed asset was assumed to be functional was calculated to provide a way to rank the importance of assets and estimate the risk reduction that can be achieved. The analysis identified 35 assets whose strategic resilience planning could reduce overall risk across the considered initiating events ranging between 81% and <1% (see Table I ). For instance, if bus B136 never failed due to any of the seismic initiating events, the overall risk would have reduced by 81%.
V. GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCE-RESULTS
The expected risk due to geomagnetic disturbance events to the benchmark system is <1 MW-t/yr. Storms with peak amplitude of 1 V/km and 8 V/km at the reference latitude did not result in any transformer failures in the study region. Though an estimated 18 transformers were likely to fail conditional on the 20-V/km initiating event, two transformers were found to contribute to load loss (0.03% of total load) due to redundancy in the network layout. Average amplitudes for this event ranged from 3.4 V/km at the lowest latitude (south) to 4.8 V/km at the highest latitude (north) within study region. The geographical variability observed is due to dependence on the α parameter L142, L143, L144, L145,  L150, L275, L280, L281,  L282, L297, B80, B94, B79,  B17, B22, B92, B107, T32,  T39, T41, T45, T46, T49,  T52, T53, T54, T55, T57,  T62, T64, T65, T66, T69,  T70, T71 in (1) . Correspondingly, the average induced current ranged from 27 to 23 A. Note that network specific parameters a and b in (3) determine the peak induced current and the chosen values of 5 A km/V were hypothetical for the benchmark system. The importance results in Table I indicate that strengthening transformers T64 and T65 is likely to mitigate risk to the network due to this hazard.
VI. MULTIHAZARD POWER GRID RISK ASSESSMENT
If HILF event risk is estimated as per the process described for a single hazard and replicated across the multiple hazards that exist for the region under study, then the full value of the HILF event risk framework approach can be appreciated (e.g., compare across hazard impacts, identify assets commonly vulnerable, and formulate planning investment portfolio). The results of such an assessment provide planners with the information they need to set risk-informed priorities. We foresee our research moving in a direction that will empower planners to make decisions based on multihazard risk-informed information. That said, it should be noted that at the current time challenges persist in the availability of domain models across all hazards and as such decisions will need to be taken in the presence of uncertainties and availability of state of the art models to perform an HILF event risk assessment on the power grid. A full-fledged epistemic uncertainty assessment is not deemed necessary given the challenges with the objective of broadly solving the resource allocation problem.
As an example, Tables I and II show that transformers T64 and T65 are vulnerable to both seismic and geomagnetic disturbance hazards. These assets require proper planning in anticipation of disruption caused due to the realization of either hazard.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated the feasibility and value of using the HILF event framework for assessing extreme event risk to power grid by piloting it to a limited extent from end-to-end for seismic and geomagnetic hazards. Insights gained from the implementation provide a strategic roadmap for future research including continuous improvement of the framework itself and real-world implementations. Now that a platform for implementation is available and that it is flexible enough to accommodate HILF event assessment for different hazards, we intend to focus our efforts on demonstrating value of the framework in multihazard risk-informed decision making for infrastructure security and energy restoration.
